Second
Democratic Republic
The last decade of the 20th century proved to be extremely tense for Georgia.
Ethnic conflicts and civil wars, combined with severe economic and political
crises, had devastated the country, turning it from one of the most prosperous
Soviet republic into one of the poorest and underdeveloped states in Europe.
Georgia’s political development during these years of turmoil and her
struggle to maintain independence vis-à-vis the neo-imperialist aspirations
of Russia, are very complicated and difficult to illustrate.
The success of the Georgian national-liberation movement, which culminated in
the Georgian declaration of independence in 1991, soon proved to be
bittersweet. President Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s anti-Russian and nationalistic
policies, and increasingly authoritarian rule led to an acute political
conflict in Georgia in 1990-1991. The government adopted the doctrine of
“hosts and guests” and threatened national minorities residing in Georgia.
Gamsakhurdia himself saw enemies everywhere around him and denounced his
political opponents as “agents and stooges of the Kremlin.” The new
president’s erratic policies soon led to the resignation of several key
government members, including Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua and Foreign Minister
Giorgi Khoshtaria.
In the fall of 1991, demonstrations against Gamsakhurdia’s government
regularly took place in Tbilisi. Georgian society, including national security
forces, became split into two opposing sides. As clashes escalated in Tbilisi,
Gamsakhurdia declared a state of emergency and cracked down on the opposition.
Some units of the National Guard, led by Tengiz Kitovani, withdrew to the
outskirts of the Georgian capital, where they defied orders to disband and
began preparations for a military coup. Gamsakhurdia’s former allies joined
forces with the opposition, which now included the National Independence Party
(Irakli Tserteli), Popular Front (Nodar Natadze), Rustaveli Society (Akaki
Bakradze), National Democratic Party (Giorgi Chanturia), etc.
In late December 1991, Kitovani’s forces launched an assault on Tbilisi and
were supported by the Mkhedrioni paramilitary units led by Jaba Ioseliani. By
22 December, the rebels besieged the Parliament building, where Gamsakhurdia
and his loyal troops put up a fierce resistance. The resulting fighting led to
many deaths and destruction of the central district of Tbilisi. On 6 January
1992, Gamsakhurdia finally broke through the blockade and escaped to Armenia
and then to Chechnya, where he organized his government in exile. Kitovani and
Ioseliani, with support of former Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua, established an
interim government, the Military Council. To legalize their coup against a
democratically elected president, the members of the Military Council invited
Eduard Shevardnadze, whose international clout was imperative to decriminalize
the new authorities. In March 1992, Shevardnadze became the head of the State
Council.
Meanwhile, the situation in Georgia escalated and led to ethno-territorial
conflicts that plunged the country in the abyss of civil war and economic
collapse. In February 1992, fighting intensified in South Ossetia, where
Russia provided covert support for separatists. Shevardnadze was forced to
make concessions and signed an armistice in July 1992 that established the
Joint Control Commission to regulate the conflict. Fighting in Ossetia was
barely over when tensions in secessionist Abkhazia, also supported by Russia,
led to violence in August 1992. Georgian authorities dispatched the National
Guard and paramilitary units and the sporadic clashes soon escalated into a
major war between the Russian-backed separatists and Georgian forces. Within a
year, Georgian troops were routed and some 300,000 Georgian and other
residents of Abkhazia expelled in a widespread ethnic cleansing of the region.
The entanglement of official Tbilisi in Abkhazia encouraged Zviad Gamsakhurdia
to return to Georgia, where he rallied forces in his native region of
Mingrelia (Samegrelo) and in Tbilisi. In June 1992, Zviadists seized the state
television center in Tbilisi, but were driven out by the National Guard. In
1993, the pro-Gamsakhurdia forces under Colonel Loti Kobalia launched a
surprise attack against the government troops in Mingrelia and occupied
strategic positions in the regions. Their actions played a crucial role in the
failure of Georgian forces in Abkhazia since reinforcements were delayed or
diverted to fight the insurgency. Threatened on both fronts, Shevardnadze was
forced to make concessions to Russia and join the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) in return for Russian military support against the rebels. In
October 1993, Georgian government forces, supported by the Russian troops,
launched a counterattack against Gamsakhurdia’s forces; the Russian navy
landed troops to secure the strategic port of Poti. Heavy fighting took place
around Samtredia, Khobi, Senaki and Zugdidi; the combat was particularly
savage in Mingrelia (Samegrelo) proper, where the Mkhedrioni paramilitary
units went on a rampage. These atrocities contributed to the eventual
antagonism of Mingrelians towards Shevardnadze and his government. By December
1993, most of Mingrelia was under government control and the pro-Gamsakhurdia
leaders imprisoned; Gamsakhurdia himself was found dead under suspicious
circumstances (the official version supports a suicide) near the village of
Jikhashkari.
The civil war remains one of the most dramatic and decisive events in history
of modern Georgia. A prosperous Soviet republic, Georgia was completely
devastated during the three years of conflict, with the economy and industry
shattered and the population suffering from gas and electric outages. The
collapse of the central authorities led to the rise of numerous criminal gangs
while the activities of Mkhedrioni paramilitary units affected thousands of
citizens throughout the country. The civil war certainly contributed to the
separatist movements in Ossetia and Abkhazia by radicalizing the sides
involved in this conflicts and diverting much-needed Georgian resources. Other
regions, notably Adjara and Javakheti, became increasingly defiant of the
central authorities. Furthermore, Georgian society itself became split into
two irreconcilable sides that became engaged in a vicious struggle for the
next decade.
As the conflicts in Abkhazia and Ossetia subsided in 1994, Shevardnadze turned
to domestic affairs and sought to restore the central authority that was
gravely weakened during the turmoil. Over the next three years, he
outmaneuvered his political opponents and consolidated his authority. The once
powerful warlords Jaba Ioseliani and Kitovani were imprisoned and paramilitary
units banned. In August 1995, a new Constitution was adopted establishing the
institute of the Presidency and the Parliament. In 1995, and later in 2000,
Shevardnadze was elected President of Georgia, though elections were marred by
claims of widespread fraud and vote rigging. In August 1995, Shevardnadze
barely survived an assassination attempt during the official signing ceremony
of the Constitution on 29 August and used this event to get rid of his
opposition. In early February 1998 Shevardnadze survived another attempt on
his life and investigations alleged Zviadist involvement, leading to increased
persecutions of Gamsakhurdia’s supporters. In October 1998, a two-day armed
insurrection by pro-Gamsakhurdia troops threatened to destabilize Georgia but
ended after the mutineers surrendered to government forces.
Shevardnadze’s presidency constitutes an important period in the recent
history of Georgia. On his arrival, the country was ravaged by a civil war and
ethnic conflicts, the economic and industrial infrastructure was largely
destroyed. Georgian society itself was demoralized, divided into factions and
dominated by warlords. Using his former contacts in the diplomatic world,
Shevardnadze established close relations with the United States, which he
perceived as a counterbalance to the Russian influence in Transcaucasia.
Georgia soon became a major recipient of U.S. foreign and military aid, signed
a strategic partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
even declared its goal of joining NATO and the European Union (EU). One of
Shevardnadze’s major achievements was showing to Western and American
policymakers that Georgia can serve as a secure East-West energy corridor,
which allowed Tbilisi to secure a multi-billion oil pipeline project
(Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) to transport oil from the Caspian Sea to the European
markets. In 1999, Georgia celebrated another important success as it joined
the Council of Europe and, in 2000, Tbilisi became the 137th member of the
World Trade Organization. In 2002, Georgia announced its resolve to seek full
membership in the Euro-Atlantic alliance, becoming a member of NATO’s
Partnership for Peace.
However, Shevardnadze’s relative successes in foreign affairs were more than
outweighed by domestic failures. While economic reforms were launched, they
were not far-reaching enough and were often erratically enforced. The shadow
economy accounted for as much as 60 percent of the country’s economic
product as tax evasion, smuggling, extortion, bribery and rigged privatization
became pervasive. Shevardnadze was unable to restore central authority in some
regions, especially in Adjara. Supporters of Gamsakhurdia and other dissidents
were persecuted and many imprisoned on trumped-up charges. Corruption became
so rampant that Georgia became known as one of the world's most corrupt
countries. Shevardnadze's closest advisers and associates, including members
of his family, exerted disproportionate economic power and controlled large
portions of the oil trade and media holdings. In 2001, Shevardnadze began an
extensive anti-corruption reform but it proved to be an empty gesture. In
October 2001, public discontent led to protests in Tbilisi, after Rustavi 2,
an independent television station that had been critical of the government,
was raided by security officials. Public demonstrations forced Shevardnadze to
announce the dismissal of his entire government in November. In April 2002,
economic woes were worsened by a natural disaster as a powerful earthquake
rocked Tbilisi, causing extensive damage to some 2,500 buildings.
Irritated by Georgia’s pro-Western course, Russia actively encouraged
separatism in Abkhazia and Ossetia while effectively declaring an economic
blockade that resulted in widespread power and gas cuts in Georgia. The
escalating war in Chechnya further deteriorated Russo-Georgian relations as
Russia accused Shevardnadze of harboring Chechen guerrillas. After the
terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, Georgia became a
strategic partner in the American war against international terrorism. Tbilisi
offered Georgian airspace and airfields to America during the operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq and contributed troops to the international contingent in
Iraq. In 2002, Shevardnadze turned to the U.S. for assistance to enhance
Georgia’s military preparedness and a special Train and Equip Program to
train the Georgian army was launched with the financial backing from
Washington.
The charges of dishonesty and fraud left Shevardnadze’s vulnerable during
the Parliamentary elections of 2003. The officially announced results of this
election favored Shevardnadze’s ruling party but were immediately denounced
as rigged and unfair by the opposition and international election observers.
This caused massive demonstrations, popularly known as the Rose Revolution,
demanding the resignation of the president. Led by Shevardnadze’s one-time
protégés, Zurab Zhvania, Nino Burdjanadze and Mikhail Saakashvili, the
protesters broke into Parliament on 21 November 2003, forcing Shevardnadze to
escape with his bodyguards. Pressured by foreign powers, Shevardnadze
announced his resignation on 23 November and was replaced as president on an
interim basis by Burdjanadze.
Thus, a powerful coalition of reformists headed by Saakashvili, Burdjanadze
and Zhvania found itself at the helm of the state. In January 2004,
Saakashvili won a landslide victory in the presidential elections. He pushed
through constitutional amendments that strengthened the powers of the
president and restored the post of prime minister for his ally Zurab Zhvania.
Saakashvili’s first great success came in removing Aslan Abashidze, the
defiant leader of Adjara, and bringing this region back under control of the
central authorities. He sought to reconcile Georgian society by rehabilitating
former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia and releasing Gamsakhurdia’s supporters
who were imprisoned by the Shevardnadze government. Saakashvili also pushed
through the change of state symbols and adopted new national flag and coat of
arms in 2004; furthermore, in a bid to portray Georgia as a European state,
the new administration had ordered the flag of European Union to be flown
together with the state flag at government buildings.
Economic reforms and improvements in living standards are of great priority
since almost half of the population of Georgia lives below the poverty line.
The low rate of economic growth places Georgia as 100th out of the 177
countries listed in the United Nation Development Program's Human Development
Report of 2005, significantly lower than most of the transitional countries. A
growing gap between the rich and poor is also of great concern.
Saakashvili’s government directed its efforts to fighting the widespread
black economy, reforming tax codes, imposing more rigorous tax-collection and
making the country more attractive for foreign investment. Georgia’s
economic reforms and new round of privatization earned praise from the
international community and helped secure new credit lines from the
International Monetary Fund and World Bank. The military forces were
substantially modernized and increased. More far-reaching, and dramatic, was
the new government’s anti-corruption campaign that purged the government
bureaucracy of thousands of officials. The family and clan structure of
Georgian society continued to facilitate a system in which corruption could
easily flourish. Thus, the watchdog Transparency International ranked Georgia
on the 124th place (out of 133) in 2003 and on the 133rd place (out of 145) in
2004. It remains to be seen if the new government will be able to eradicate
corruption – which is so widespread and deeply rooted in Georgian society
– in the short term.
Another priority spelled out by Saakashvili after his election is
bringing back the breakaway regions under Georgian authority. After
restoring control of Adjara, the new presidency shifted its attention
towards the separatist region of South Ossetia, which led to sharp
tensions and brief clashes between the two sides. In 2006-2007, Tbilisi
supported the establishment of the pro-Georgian forces in South
Ossetia, where an alternative government (led by Dmitri Sanakoyev) was
formed to counter-balance the separatist authorities. In May-June 2007,
the Georgian government made a major push to have international
community recognize Sanakoyev's government, a first step in the
potential conflict resolution. In late June 2007, Sanakoyev made an
unprecedented three-day visit to Brussels as part of Tbilisi’s campaign
to align conflict resolution in Georgia with European, rather than
Russian, interests.
In Abkhazia, after years of status-quo, political situation has
slightly changed in the fall of 2006, when the Georgian authorities
carried out a security operation against a rebel warlord in the Upper
Abkhazia and, after securing the region, moved the seat of the
Abkhazian government-in-exile there. This decision caused an outcry on
the part of the Abkhaz separatists, as well as in Russia, who denounced
Tbilisi's actions as a first step towards forceful resolution of the
conflict. Since then, the Abkhaz authorities refuse to participate in
diplomatic negotiations until Tbilisi agrees to remove the Abkhazian
government-in-exile from the upper Abkhazia.
The issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are very sensitive indeed and
cannot be seen separately from the relations with Russia, which exerts
great influence in the separatist regions; as former Georgian president
Eduard Shevardnadze once commented, "the keys to the conflict
resolution in these regions lay in the Russian hands." Yet, Relations
with Russia remain of major concern in light of Russia's continuing
political, economic and military support of separatist authorities in
both regions. The new government of Georgia pursues a strongly
pro-Western, particularly pro-US, foreign policy and seeks Georgian
membership in the NATO and the EU. After the start of the American war
in Iraq, Georgia joined the coalition forces and remains one of the
major contributors to the coalition in terms of a country's per capita
troop deployment. In 2004, the North Atlantic Council of the NATO
approved the Individual Partnership Action Plan of Georgia (IPAP). In
May 2005, Georgia was visited by the U.S. President George W. Bush and
greeted by tens of thousands of Georgians at the Freedom Square in
Tbilisi. With the US backing, Georgia achieved a historic agreement
with Russia on the complete withdrawal of Russian military bases by
2008. Such pro-Western overtures only embitter Georgia’s northern
neighbor, which still perceives south Caucasia as its sphere of
influence and vital to its geo-strategic interests.
In 2006, the Russo-Georgian relations hit a new low. In the spring, in
the so-called “wine war,” Russia banned the imports of Georgian wine.
The official explanation that the ban was motivated by health concerns
was hardly convincing since Georgia had long been supplying the Russian
market and sudden detection by the Russians of health hazards in
Georgian wine naturally raised eyebrows. Furthermore, the ban was not
followed by an order to remove Georgian wine already in Russia, which
would have been a logical move to protect the Russian consumers from a
detected health concern. Ironically, even after the ban, Georgian wine
products continued to appear suggesting that a significant portion of
the Georgian wine was produced/falsified inside Russia. Still, Russia's
decision to close its market had a serious effect on the Georgian
winemakers, who scrambled to seek new markets for their products.
Despite initial difficulties, the Russian ban may end up benefiting the
Georgian wine business since it was compelled to diversify its markets
and introduce Georgian wine to new regions.
The Russo-Georgian squabbles were not limited to the "wine war" alone
but the intrastate relations further deteriorated in September/October
2006 when the Georgian government arrested four Russian military
officers on charges of espionage; seeking arrest of one more Russian
officer, the Georgian authorities surrounded the headquarters of the
Russian forces in Transcaucasia located in Tbilisi. This event brought
the Russo-Georgian relations to the lowest point in over a decade. In
response to Tbilisi's actions, Russia summoned its ambassador to
Georgia and withdrew almost all of its embassy’s staff, and imposed a
series of punitive measures on Georgia, suspending all land, see, and
air transportation between Georgia and Russia, banning Georgian exports
to Russia, and locating, rounding up, and deporting many legal and
illegal Georgian migrants from Russia. Such persecutions led to
international outcry condemning Russian authorities for their
xenophobic actions. Relations between Tbilisi and Moscow remain tense,
although in June 2007, Presidents Saakashvili and Putin agreed to
normalize relations and Russia pledged to lift its sanctions.
However, hardly anything practical came
out from this pledge since neither Tbilisi nor Moscow were willing to
compromise. Furthermore, with oil and gas prices at their highest, Russia
increasingly flexed its muscles on international scene. Russia's resurgence became vividly clear in the summer of 2008 when the Georgian government’s bid to restore its sovereignty over a pro-Russian breakaway region rapidly developed into a war between two countries. On August 8, in response to days of minor
hostilities with separatists, the Georgian military entered South Ossetia and almost captured its administrative center
Tskhinvali before the Russian military’s intervention reversed the process. In the largest operation since the collapse of the USSR, the Russian army repelled the Georgians from South Ossetia and then launched major land, naval and aerial operations throughout Georgia. Many Georgian military facilities and industries were destroyed and strategic locations, including the Black Sea Port of Poti and the city of Gori, occupied. In a dramatic reversal of its earlier policies, Moscow also recognized the independence of Georgia's two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and established formal relations with them. Officially, the war ended on August 12 when Tbilisi and Moscow agreed to a European Union (EU) ceasefire negotiated by the EU rotational president, French President Nicholas Sarkozy. However, practically, it continued with a lesser intensity at least for another week as both Georgia and Russia accused each other of violating the ceasefire. Following a new round of negotiations, Russian withdrew most of its forces from the Georgian territory proper by 9 October but retained its presence in the breakaway regions.
The Russo-Georgia war had a profound effect on regional politics and Russia’s relations with the Western countries. It sent a clear signal to the world that Russia is resurgent and ready to use force to protect its interests. The conflict severely undermined the already tense Russian-Western relations and revived fears of another "Cold War." Georgia has developed close relationship with the United States and, to Russia, such close relations is a cause of great alarm since it implies increased US presence in what Moscow has historically considered its backyard. Russia accused the US of instigating the war as part of an American policy to secure its influence in ex-Soviet republics and encircle Russia. The Russian leaders also condemned NATO’s eastward expansion to the Caucasus which threaten Russian strategic interest. Russia’s intervention in Georgia prompted the angry reaction of the American government and NATO both of which described the Russian reaction as an act of aggression and a sign of rising Russian imperialism. To some, Russia's recognition of separatist regions, which was only supported by Nicaragua, seemed a response to the Western recognition of Kosovo's independence from Serbia, a historic ally of Russia.
The conflict also revealed the weakness on the part of the Western powers. It became obvious that the US, tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, and confronting Iran and North Korea, is in no position to oppose Russia and has to placate Russian interests in the Caucasus. The European Union failed to react as a bloc since its members were divided between those supporting the US call for harsher stance against Russia and those seeking to avoid further worsening of their relations with Russia, a major supplier of energy resources to Europe. As a result, the EU members only agreed to facilitate a ceasefire and send humanitarian aid to Georgia.
